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1. Introduction 
Capital is at the heart of capitalism: it is, accordingly, not surprising that 
we should look to failures in capital markets to account for one of the most 
important failures of capitalism, the marked fluctuations in output and 
employment which have characterized capitalism throughout its history. 
For more than a decade now, I and several of my co-authors (in 
particular, Bruce Greenwald and Andrew Weiss) have been exploring the 
thesis that it is imperfections in the capital market - imperfections which 
themselves can be explained by imperfect information - which account for 
many of the peculiar aspects of the behavior of the economy which macro- 
economics attempts to exp1ain.r In this lecture, I want to provide an 
overview of that endeavor, to explain why it is that we have increasing 
confidence in the importance of capital market imperfections, to contrast our 
*Marshall Lecture delivered to the European Economic Association Meetings, Cambridge, 
U.K., 1991. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Hoover Institution 
is gratefully acknowledged. This paper reports on joint work with Bruce Greenwald. I am also 
indebted to my other co-authors with whom I have been engaged in research on the issues 
discussed in this paper, in particular, to Andrew Weiss; and to K. Hoff, Marco Da Rin and 
And& Rodriguez for helpful comments on a previous draft. 
‘Others before us have recognized the importance of capital markets. Perhaps the most 
complete articulation of these views which is closest in spirit to that presented here is that of 
Lindbeck (1963), who goes on to stress the distinction between debt and equity (which, as we 
shall see, underlies much of our analysis), and the role of credit rationing, More recent studies 
include the work of Gerler and Bemanke (1989, 1990). Our own work is presented in a series of 
papers (see references). A set of recent empirical studies are collected together in Hubbard 
(199% 
Capital markets played an important role in the ideas of Leijonhufvud and Minsky, and in 
the later work of Hicks (1988). The role of capital market imperfections in investment was, 
ironically, stressed in one of the earliest econometric studies of investment, that of Meyer and 
Kuh (1959). 
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Table 1 I 
Variation in levels of investment from litted trends, selected countries and periods, 1947-1986.’ 
output: 
Standard deviations 
of variations from 
Country and period trend (pe.rcent)b 
Full period 
United States (1947-1986) 2.04 
Japan (1965-1986) 1.48 
West Germany (1960-1986) 1.58 
Great Britain (1960-1986) 1.75 
Australia (1969-1986) 1.52 
Ratio of investment standard deviations 
to output standard deviations 
Overall Residential Durable 
investments structureP equipme& 
4.46 5.45 3.13 
3.55 4.36 3.28 
3.81 3.01 
4.34 2.90 
7.57 4.86 4.44 
1967-1986 
United States 1.88 4.87 6.76 3.45 
Japan 1,82 3.09 3.22 2.77 
West Germany 1964 3.65 2.85 
Great Britain 1.70 4.10 2.89 
1947-1966 
United States 2.27 3.89 4.11 2.74 
‘Reprinted from Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988a) based on authors’ calculations with quarterly 
data from Citibank Citisource Database. 
bTrend GNP was calculated by Wing a piexxwise linear function (over four years) to the log 
of actual real GNP. 
‘Quarterly data. The trend was calculated using a piecewise linear trend over four years. 
explanations with some others that are currently fashionable, and to indicate 
some of the directions which our current research is taking. 
2. The anomalies 
Science has sometimes been described as an attempt to explain anomalies, 
things which are puzzling. Economic science is no different. Among the 
principal puzzles which have preoccupied macro-economists, five will be the 
center of my attention today. 
2.1. The magnitude of the fluctuations 
The first puzzle concerns the magnitude and persistence of the fluctuations 
which have buffeted the economy (table 1). It is not just that one sector has 
its ups and downs, but that the aggregate level of activity, whether measured 
by employment or output, fluctuates, and its principal components, including 
aggregate consumption and investment, fluctuate, and fluctuate together. To 
be sure, the world economy is constantly buffeted by shocks - good weather 
in Iowa, leading to a bumper crop of maize there; bad weather in Brazil, 
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leading to a small coffee harvest. But macro-economics is concerned with 
aggregate movements, and the puzzle is, why should these sectoral shocks 
make much d@%rence: to a large extent they should be offsetting - shifts in 
demand result in positive boosts to one sector, offset by declines in others. 
Moreover, standard price theory predicts that price responses will dampen 
the magnitudes of the overall economy’s responses: an initial supply shock, 
for instance, results in a much smaller quantity response as a result of an 
offsetting price movement. 
Lags and buffers serve to dampen further the economy’s response: the 
fluctuations in coffee output may have hardly any consequences on the 
permanent income of coffee growers, or the real income of coffee drinkers; a 
bad crop necessitates using up some of the coffee put away in a buffer stock; 
an exceptionally good crop entails putting coffee into the buffer stock. For 
households, savings provide a buffer; individuals can draw out of the buffer 
in bad years, and put into the buffer in good years. Even in the rapidly 
changing field of computers, it will be several years before the new invention 
which has made my computer obsolete is fully disseminated - long enough 
that the economy may have turned half or more of a cycle. 
It is precisely the recognition of the difficulty of finding real shocks that 
could account for the magnitude of observed fluctuations that led so many 
economists to look to monetary disturbances. 
2.2. The non-neutrality of money 
But here, we encounter the second puzzle: the classical dichotomy said that 
money should not matter; money determined the price level, but real 
magnitudes - output, employment, investment, etc. - were determined by 
relative prices (including relative intertemporal prices, i.e. real interest rates).’ 
Yet the evidence3 suggests clearly that monetary policy has real 
effects. Monetary policy might affect money prices, and even money interest 
rates (intertemporal money prices), but why should it affect anything real? 
Keynesian and New Keynesian economists have a ready answer: price 
rigidities. But, as I shall explain below, the traditional explanations for those 
price rigidities remain shaky,4 the mechanisms by which price rigidities, 
‘Indeed, recent theoretical work seems to have strengthened the case for the classical 
dichotomy; see, e.g. Barro (1974) and Stiglitx (1988b). 
zToo abundant to cite here: but I have in mind more than just the money-income 
correlations, which, as Tobin forcefully pointed out, are hardly convincing. Most neutral 
observers hould have been convinced of the non-neutrality of monetary policy by the major 
recession which the Fed induced in the United States in the early 1980s. 
%ee below for some of the critiques of the currently most fashionable explanation, ‘menu 
costs’. 
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combined with changes in the money supply, lead to real effects remain 
debatable,’ and, overall, the conclusion that these price rigidities, combined 
with fluctuations in the money supply, are to blame for the economic 
fluctuations is even more suspect. It is not that one cannot write down 
models in which such rigidities can have real effects - one obviously can - 
but that one cannot formulate models in which the magnitudes of the effects, 
through the specified channels, seem large enough to account for the non- 
neutralities which are observed. 
One reason that this hypothesis is suspect is the worldwide experience of 
output, and employment fluctuations in the presence of inflation: surely, the 
problems in this case cannot be attributed to downward money rigidities. 
Another reason is that if we look more closely at some of the loci of 
fluctuations - investment, and in particular, construction (see table 1) - we 
see that these sectors, in which prices are particularly flexible (prices are 
negotiated, since items are produced individually) are even more volatile than 
aggregate output. 
2.3. Shifts in the aggregate supply curvy 
So far, we have argued that the observed fluctuations in output are greater 
than can be accounted for by standard theory: given that many of the shocks 
to the economy are offsetting, given the (price) shock absorbers, buffers, and 
lags built in the economy, it is hard to find real disturbances of the required 
magnitude; and it is hard to understand how monetary disturbances have any 
effect, let alone effects of the required magnitude. Whatever the source of the 
sOne long popular theory (which underlies many of the fixed price models) employs real 
balance effects. Changes in real balances of households makes them feel wealthier, and thus 
consume more; more telling than the theoretical criticisms, based on the Barro-Bicardo effect, is 
the fact that, given empirical estimates of the wealth elasticity of consumption, this effect simply 
is not very important, even with the largest observed variations in real balances. 
A second mechanism focuses on the money market; an increase in the real supply of money 
lowers interest rates; elsewhere [Stiglitx (1988a)], I have provided an extensive critique of this 
mechanism; the most important point is simply that, over long periods of time, variations in real 
interest rates have simply been too small for them to play an important role. 
Finally, Tobin has emphasized the effect of changes in the real money and bond supply on the 
price of equities, through general portfolio effects. At a theoretical level, these models (in the 
absence of .capital market imperfections, the subject of this lecture) do not provide a convincing 
theory [see Stiglitx (1988b)]; empirically, models testing Tobin’s q have not fared well, and for 
good reason - as we point out below, new equity is a relatively unimportant source of funds for 
investment. The observed correlation is more than likely not a causal relation; stock prices and 
investment are both high when firm prospects are good. 
Though one can easily construct models where changes in the rules by which the money 
supply changes have real effe.cts (even when the mean rate of change of the money supply is 
constant) when households are risk averse, again these effects almost surely do not account for 
the magnitude of the observed non-neutralities. 
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Table 2 
Change in real product wages, selected industries, Great 
Depression, U.S.: 1929-1932. 
Industry 




Producers’ durable equipment 





disturbance, there is a third puzzle: to a large extent, the output variations 
represent shifts in the aggregate supply curve. What can account for such 
large sh@s in the aggregate supply schedule? 
Consider a simple aggregate production function, where, as we do 
conventionally, we keep the magnitude of capital fixed in the background: 
Q = F(L), (1) 
where Q is aggregate output and L is aggregate employment. Then labor 
ought to be hired up to the point where the real wage equals the marginal 
product, 
W/P = F’(L), (2) 
where w is the wage and p the price level; or, viewing this from the supply 
side, output is a function simply of the real wage. 
Q = F(F’- ‘(w/p)). (3) 
Real (product) wages do not vary much over the business cycle, so that 
output produced should not vary much. In fact, as table 2 illustrates, in 
many sectors, real product wages actually fell in the Great Depression, 
implying that output should have increased! The rigidity of real wages, while 
itself a puzzle, makes the fluctuations in output all the more puzzling. What 
can account for the evidently large shift in the aggregate supply schedule? 
2.3.1. Changes in the degree of competition 
There are two resolutions of this puzzle which I wish to dispense with 
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quickly. The first is that there is imperfect competition, and that changes in 
the degree of monopoly can account for the observed shifts in output. Of 
course, with imperfect competition, we need to dispense with the aggregate 
supply curve. We replace the condition (2) with the condition 
W/P = (1 - uw(U (4) 
where /I is the elasticity of demand, so that aggregate output, as a function of 
the real wage, can be written 
Q=F(F’-‘(w/p(l- l/j?))). 
If competition becomes less keen in a recession, then at a given real wage, 
output will be reduced. While I believe that product markets are imperfectly 
competitive [within the macro-economics context, Robert Hall (1988) has 
provided convincing evidence on this],’ and that these imperfections do 
play a role (though a secondary one) in any complete explanation of the 
economy’s fluctuations, I do not believe that the variations in the degree of 
competition can account for the shifts in the (pseudo-) supply functions. This 
is not to deny that it is conceivable - even likely - that the degree of 
competition varies over the cycle. The variety of reasons for this I explored 
in my 1984 paper. The question is, can the pattern and magnitudes of these 
variations account for the observed pattern and magnitudes of variations of 
real product wages and output in different industries? One problem is that 
we should expect the degree of competition to decrease in some industries, 
as, for instance, the threat of entry becomes decreased; but to increase in 
others, as the value of collusion, particularly of firms whose life expectancy 
has been reduced, decreases.’ More importantly, among the industries in 
which we see the most variability are those, like construction, that appear 
most competitive. Surely, in these industries, oligopoly models’ cannot 
explain pricing policies. 
2.3.2. Technology shocks (real business cycles) 
The second explanation for the shifting supply curve is that technology is 
changing. Obviously, if we rewrite the production function 
60kun’s Law can be interpreted as having long made the case for some kind of market 
imperfection: the fact that output increases more than proportionately with employment means 
that the economy exhibits short run increasing returns. This is consistent, for insistence, with 
monopolistic competition, with firms operating on the downward sloping portion of their 
average cost curve. The claim that Okun’s Law can be explained by some kind of labor 
hoarding does not obviate the necessity of invoking some form of imperfection in competition: 
for labor hoarding implies that the short run marginal cost of production is very low. 
‘Though admittedly, if collusion is to be sustained, it may necesxitate an increase in mark-ups. 
sFor instance, of the kind explored by Rotemberg and !&dotter (1986). 
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Q = AW), 
where A represents the ‘state of technology’, then (5) becomes 
Q=AF(F'-'(w/p/l)), (7) 
so variations in A will indeed induce variations in Q at fixed real wages. But 
we cannot account for the magnitude of those fluctuations, in particular for 
the downward movements in the supply function. While crop failures may be 
interpreted as a negative shock to A, the downward movement of the 
economy in the Great Depression, or more recently in the Reagan recession 
or the Bush recession, cannot be traced to any such shock.g Yet, remark- 
ably, a major school of macro-economics within the United States - the real 
business cycle theories, which I discuss further below - has attempted to do 
just that. 
2.4. Patterns of sectoral movements 
The fourth puzzle is concerned with patterns of sectoral movement, some 
aspects of which I have already referred to. Investment in general, and 
inventories and construction in particular, fluctuate more than output (table 
1). The puzzle of these fluctuations is that in recessions, the marginal costs of 
construction or production are low. Real interest rates are sufficiently low 
that we ought to observe production smoothing - inventory accumulation in 
recessions, decumulation in booms,” We ought to see firms take advantage 
9The list of criticisms of the technological interpretation to economic fluctuations is not meant 
to be exhaustive: if the source of disturbance were technological, then the shocks should be 
industry related, and correlations in movements of the outputs of particular industries across 
countries should be greater than correlations of movements of output across industries within a 
country. This appears not to be the case. 
Nor can the theory really do an adequate job accounting for the magnitude of the 
fluctuations: given the buffers, lags, and the price ‘shock absorber’ the original disturbances 
would have to be truly large, and their occurrence would be associated with large changes in 
capital values. It is hard to find the direct empirical confirmation of these large disturbances. 
Surely, if they were large, they should be observable! 
loSee Blinder and Mac&i (1991). As they point out, there have been a number of attempts to 
resolve the inventory paradox within the neoclassical framework, but none has really succeeeded. 
Some inventories (such as inventories of raw materials) are used for production purposes, and 
these should accordingly increase in proportion to output. The inventory puzzle with which we 
are concerned is most apparent in the consumer goods sector. Lucas (1981) discussed the 
broader puzzle of volatility in investment: ‘The volatility of business investment over the cycle is 
at least as severe a paradox as the cyclical behavior of employment, since the principal 
characteristic of optimal investment behavior (as we understand it theoretically) is the way it 
smooths reactions to transient shocks’. He goes on to provide an explanation: ‘Volatile cyclical 
investment must be explicable, exactly as it [sic] volatile cyclical employment, only as a repeated 
mistake’ (p, 15). The model we present shows that one does not have to rely on mistaken 
expectations. 
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of low construction costs to build long-lived capital goods, the value of 
which is likely to be virtually unaffected whether the recovery begins this 
month or in six months from now. 
2.5. Persistence 
The fifth, and final, puzzle to which I wish to draw attention is that of 
persistence, the serial correlation in output and employment. It is easy to 
construct models that give rise to some persistence, even if the economy were 
buffeted with i.i.d. shocks. Any model in which there is a state variable (like 
capital) will give rise to some correlation: the effects of a negative shock will 
be felt in subsequent years. The problem is not to construct a model with 
some correlation, but to construct plausible models with correlations of the 
required magnitudes. 
3. Some preliminary methodological remarks 
There is a basic, well recognized scientific principle we have employed in 
our exploration of explanations for these puzzles: Ockham’s razor. We have 
sought a single explanation (or set of related explanations) which explain all 
of these phenomena, or at least as many as possible. We have based our 
analysis on micro-economic principles, not the micro-economic principles of 
neoclassical models based on a complete set of perfectly competitive markets 
with perfect information; but rather the micro-economic principles derived 
from models in which markets are incomplete and information is imperfect 
(with the incompleteness of markets being largely accounted for by informa- 
tional imperfections). 
The pseudo-scientific ‘as if’ methodology promoted by Friedman has been 
pushed too far: a theory is to be tested not by a selected set of its 
predictions, but by all of its predictions. Among the testable parts of a theory 
are those assumptions which are themselves directly testable. Assumptions of 
technological regression are testable, and, I dare say, provide by themselves 
grounds for rejecting the real business cycle theory. We count it a virtue, not 
a vice, if the assumptions of the model are themselves plausible; if the micro- 
foundations underlying the theory are themselves testable - and tested. 
Our approach should be contrasted not only with real business cycle 
theory but also with the piecemeal approach taken in some recent macro- 
economic work. One theory (the menu cost theory) explains price rigidity by 
referring to the cost of adjustment of prices; another theory explains labor 
hoarding by referring to the cost of adjustment of labor. Having explained 
wage and price rigidities, still another theory is needed to explain the shifts 
in the supply curve; and still another theory to explain lay-offs. The 
piecemeal approach is not only unattractive, in requiring a myriad of 
explanations, but the explanations eem sometimes at odds with one another. 
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Fig. 1. Menu costs and other costs of adjustment. If the demand curve shifts, the firm must 
either adjust prices and/or quantities. The menu cost literature seems to assume that there are 
large costs to adjusting p, but no costs to adjusting quantities. 
If there are costs of adjusting outputs and inputs and prices, clearly all 
should be taken into account by the firm in deciding on how to react to a 
shift in its demand curve. Fig. 1 shows a shift in the demand curve. The 
menu cost theory, focusing on the cost of adjusting prices, says that the firm 
will keep prices constant, adjusting output, moving from Q. to Qr. But this 
makes sense only if there is no cost of adjusting output. If there is a cost of 
adjusting output - as surely there is - and if these costs exceed the costs of 
adjusting prices (the small menu costs), as seems plausibly the case in most 
industries - then the response will be a relatively fixed output and large 
variations in prices, such as standard neoclassical theory would predict. 
4. Our central hypotheses 
Our analysis begins from the premise that capital markets - the markets 
through which capital and risks are transferred from one party to another - 
are imperfect. Though we, and others, have related these capital market 
imperfections to costly and imperfect information and transactions costs,rr it 
“The micro-economics literature on this issue is by now voluminous. Se-e, e.g. Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1992), Stiglitz (1982), Greenwald, Stigiitz and Weiss (1984), 
Myers and Majluf (1984), Jensen and Meckling (1976). Different theories have focused on 
difkrent aspects of the imperfection: costly selection, costly monitoring, and costly enforcement 
(state verification.) 
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Table 3 
Period, country 
Role of equities as a source of finance. 
Net equity issues as a percent 
of total investment 
Non-financial enterprises 
Canada (1970-1985) 2.5 
Finland (1970-1985) -0.1 
France (1970-1985) -0.4 
Germany (197&1989) 0.9 
Italy (1970-1985) a.2 
Japan (1970-1987) 2.7 
U.K. (1970-1989) -8.0 
U.S. (1970-1989) -8.8 
19461958, U.S. 6.4 
1901-1912, U.S. 14 
1923-1929, U.S. 19 
1949-1953, U.S. 6 
1949-1982, Chemicals and allied 
industries, U.K. (shares plus 
long term liabilities) 14.7 
1949-1982, Electrical engineering 
firms, U.K. (shares plus 
long term liabilities) 15.0 
Sources: Colin Mayer, Financial systems, corporate finance, and economic 
development, 1990, as updated by most recent statistics available from the 
CEPR International Study of the Financing of Industry (data supplied by Tim 
Jenkins and C. Mayer). 
is our belief that the source of the imperfection is not so important as its 
nature and consequence. In particular, our analysis is based on two 
hypotheses. 
(I) The distinction between equity and debt. While debt imposes a particu- 
larly heavy risk burden on the firm (since the firm must absorb all 
fluctuations in prolits), imperfections in the equity market are severe, so that 
a relatively small fraction of new capital is raised by new equity issues. (See 
table 3 and fig. 2.) 
(2) The distinctive nature of the mechanisms by which credit (and capital more 
generally) is allocated. Credit is not allocated by means of an auction/price 
process; in many cases, it is rationed; information is spread disparately 
throughout the economy; there is limited transferability of information; and 
financial institutions, including banks, play a central role in the allocation 
process. 
J.E. Stiglitz, Capital markets and econo$cfluctuations 279 
Fig. 2. Net equity issues. New equity issues are a relatively unimportant source of capital for 
financing investment. 
Source: Reprinted from Goudie and Meeks, Company Finance and Performance (University of 
Cambridge, 1986), as reported in Mayer (1990). 
Our analysis proceeds by several steps. Focusing initially on the first 
hypothesis, we analyze the behavior of the firm. The firm has a portfolio of 
interrelated decisions to make. Among the portfolio of decisions facing a firm 
are its price and wage decisions, and its employment and investment 
decisions. We describe how these decisions respond to changes in attributes 
of the firm (in particular its net worth) and the economic environment in 
which it operates (in particular, its perception of the risks which it faces). 
These individual firm decisions are then aggregated to describe the aggregate 
behavior of the economy. 
In this first stage, we assume that the firm is not credit constrained. The 
firm has limited access to the equity market, but not to the credit market. 
Our results are thus a consequence of the form in which capital is available, 
not the amount - a distinction which our first hypothesis stresses. In the 
second stage of our analysis, we explore the consequences of limited credit 
availability, and the determinants of its availability. 
5. Equity rationing and risk avime fms 
The first hypothesis, combined with the assumption of significant bank- 
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ruptcy costs, has one critical implication: firms act in a risk averse manner. 
They cannot divest themselves of risk through equity markets. Higher levels 
of investment or production entail increased debt; the fixed obligations 
entailed by debt imply that as debt is increased, the bankruptcy probability 
is increased. lz
5.1. MoaWing risk averse behavior 
We have modelled the risk averse firm behavior in two different ways: 
maximizing expected terminal wealth, minus expected bankruptcy costs,” 
max Ea(x(x, z), B) - cPe, (8) 
where a is terminal value of the firm, a function of n, profits, which in turn 
are a function of x, a set of decisioti variables, and z, a set of (for the 
moment) exogenous parameters (environmental variables), and of B, the 
amount the firm has borrowed (which in turn is a function of x, the decision 
variables, and ao, the initial net worth of the firm), c is the cost of 
bankruptcy, and PB is the probability of bankruptcy, which in turn is a 
function of x, the decision variables, i, the interest rate the firm must pay, 
and the firm’s initial net worth. The interest rate the firm must pay, in turn, 
is a function of the decision variables x, the initial wealth a,,, and the ‘safe’ 
rate of interest, p. In Greenwald and Stiglitz (1992) we show how, in the case 
of risk neutral lenders with rational expectations, we can solve simul- 
taneously for i and P,: 
i = r(x; a,; z; p), P, = P( x; ao; z; p). 
Alternatively,14 we can think of firms as maximizing 
Wa), (9) 
where U is a concave function of profits. 
5.1 .I. Dynamic formulation 
Of course, we need to view the firm within a dynamic framework, with 
decisions today affecting the state variables which it passes on to the future. 
‘*In some formulations, if firms have a suffbziently low net worth, they act in a risk loving 
manner. The circumstances in which this occurs and the consequences are discussed more fully 
below. 
‘%ee, for instance, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988c, 1992). 
‘%ee, for instance, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987a, 1989a). 
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The three most important state variables are ‘cash’, a, inventories, N, and 
capital stock, K:15 
a ,+1=p,+lQCpt+1,~1l-Bt(l+9-dr, (10) 
where 
B, = w,L, + I, -a,, (11) 
K t+1 =K,+Z,-P& (12) 
and 
and where B= debt, @ is the production function, Q now represents sales, 
d, = dividends,16 and pi is a vector of random variables (pl is a random 
variable affecting demand, pL2 the depreciation rate, and j+ production). 
Within this more general framework, we replace the objective function (8) or 
(9) with a dynamic programming problem 
maxu(d,)+J(a,+,,K,+,,N,+,), (14) 
where J(a, K, N) is the terminal valuation of the asset position. Much of the 
discussion will, for simplicity, be couched in terms of the simpler objective 
function (8), or, alternatively, (9); reports using (14) are similar. 
5.2. Basic results 
The first central result of our analysis is that firms produce up to the point 
where (in the first formulation) expected marginal returns equal expected 
marginal bankruptcy costs,l’ which, with risk aversion, will be at a lower 
level than that at which expected (net) returns are zero. 
Consider the special case of a single decision variable, the level of 
employment. Firms, in our theory (the first formulation), produce up to the 
point where 
pF-w=*, 
where $ is the marginal bankruptcy cost (fig. 3). If we ignored the latter, we 
151n fact, any variable which cannot costlessly and instantaneously be adjusted should be 
treated as a state variable. From this perspective, wages, prices, and employment should also be 
treated as state variables. On the other hand, if there were perfect rental markets and no costs of 
adjustment of capital, K would not be a state variable, from the perspective of the firm, though 
it might be from the perspective of the economy as a whole. 
IsWe cannot present here a theory of dividend behavior. Empirical studies indicate dividends 
are closely linked to firms’ net worth, though they ratchet up, and exhibit downward rigidities. 
Such rigidities can be explained in terms of the signalling role that dividends (or, more generally, 
firm distributions) play. See Bhattacharya (1979). Our analytic work has employed the simpler 
hypothesis that dt is just a function of 4. 
“In the second formulation the expected marginal utility of (net) returns is zero. 
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Fig. 3. Output determination and volatility with risk. In the absence of risk, output (employ- 
ment) is determined at the point where pF’- w=O (the value of the marginal product equals the 
wage). Since real wages do not change much in the short run. and since the production function 
does not shift much in the short run, output does not shift. With bankruptcy risk, employment 
is set where pF’ - w = I), where $ is the marginal bankruptcy cost. This am shift markedly in the 
short run. It increases as a firm’s net worth falls, and as the perceived riskiness of production 
increases. 
would obtain the standard condition of firms producing up to the point 
where the value of the marginal product equals the wage. With little 
variability in the real wage, it is impossible to account for variability in 
supply (at the firm or macro-level): our third basic puzzle. We attribute shifts 
in the aggregate supply curve to shifts in $, the (marginal) risk of bankruptcy. 
Actual bankruptcy rates vary markedly over time (see fig. 4), and it is 
plausible to assume that marginal bankruptcy probabilities do as well. 
Having located the source of variability in the decisions undertaken by the 
firm, we need to look more closely at what determines hifts in JI. 
5.2.1. Amplification and volatility 
Changes in the net worth of the firm and the riskiness of the environment (the 
random variables) a&ct the decisions of the jrm. ,This result may hardly seem 
striking, except when it is recalled that under the standard neoclassical 





Fig. 4. Variability of bankruptcy rates. 
Source: Frankel and Montgomery (1991, p. 264). 
theory of the firm, firms act in a risk neutral manner, so that mean 
preserving spreads have no effect on decisions; and capital markets are 
perfect, so that the net worth of the firm has absolutely no effect: all 
production decisions are forward looking and do not depend at all on the 
firm’s economic status. 
Looking at eq. (lo), it is apparent that a small change in demand may 
result in a large change in a: profits are a residual, and a 5% reduction in the 
price received or the quantity sold (below what was anticipated) may result 
in a 50% reduction in profits, if the profit margin is loo/, (costs of production, 
including fixed interest payments, represent 90% of the price). Moreover, if 
firms are highly levered, a small change in a can result in large changes in 
the optimal value of decision variables, like output and employment. In one 
limiting case we explored, the change in output was proportionate to the 
change in a: the result looked like a standard accelerator model, but applied 
not only to investment in fixed assets, but also to production. A 50% 
reduction in a would result in a 50% reduction in output. Though we think 
this extreme, the lesson is more general: small disturbances can lead to large 
effects. That is why our analysis has paid less attention to the source of the 
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disturbances to the economy than to their consequences: a downturn may be 
initiated by an oil price shock, a monetary shock, or a dramatic change in 
expectations. But the structure of the economy results in an amplification of 
the effects of these disturbances, in contrast to the prediction of standard 
theory, in which price shock absorbers, lags and buffers all serve to dampen 
the effects of disturbances. 
The volatility of expectations, and the sensitivity of output to expectations 
(perceived risks) stressed by our theory provides a further channel by which 
the effects of shocks to the economy may be amplified. 
The fact that risk and leverage differ across sectors provides part of the 
explanation for differences in volatility across sectors (other parts will be 
described below); the construction industry, for instance, is highly leveraged, 
and bankruptcy is not only common, it is particularly highly variable there. 
5.2.2. Shifts in the aggregate supply function 
It is apparent that when we aggregate, the aggregate supply function will 
be volatile, because of the volatility of changes in net worth and expectations. 
But there is a further reason for shifts in the aggregate supply function. 
Earlier, we noted that in the standard neoclassical model, many of the 
disturbances to the economy are offsetting; gains to one sector are offset by 
losses to another. This is far less true in our model. 
Let us focus on the special case where the only asset of the firm is ‘u’ 
(ignoring inventories and capital). Under normal conditions, output is a 
concave function of Q: Qr=Q(ar; ) (fig. 5). This implies that shocks to the 
economy that at first glance might appear to be nothing more than 
redistribution-shifts in demand that lead to higher profits by one firm and 
lower offsetting profits to another - have real effects. Starting from an initial 
equilibrium position, an oil price increase or an oil price decrease may have 
adverse effects on the economy. This implication is markedly different from 
the standard model; there, an oil shock increase has positive effects for oil 
producers, negative effects for oil users; and the net effect simply depends on 
which predominates. Also, in that theory if, in total, the net effect of a price 
increase is negative, then the net effect of a price decrease is positive. 
5.2.3. Persistence 
Furthermore, the dynamic processes described above entail a slow res- 
ponse to an initial disturbance: if, for some reason, net worth is reduced at 
time t, production falls in subsequent periods, and only gradually will 
production be restored to normal. Fig. 6 shows the performance of the 
economy after a downward shock to Q,. On average, taking into account the 
effect of the decision variables on the state variable, 4, the average value of 
q+r depends on the value of a,. The economy was initially at the long 
equilibrium, a*, where 
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Fig. 5. Output and firm net worth. Output is a concave, increasing function of net worth. Net 
worth matters, and concavity implies that changes in the distribution of net worth also matter. 
Increasing the dispersion of net worth (but keeping mean net worth unchanged) lowers average 
output from Q* to (2. 
Ea,+,=a,=a*. 
After the disturbance, with u=ao, the economy only gradually gets restored 
to the long run equilibrium.‘* 
5.2.4. Price and wage rigidities 
Finally, the model implies different magnitudes of changes for different 
variables in response to changes in the environment, e.g. to changes in net 
worth. Abstracting, for a moment, from our more general dynamic model, 
consider, for instance, the simplest case where there are two decision 
variables, x1 and x2, with terminal wealth taking on the special formrg 
‘*This is not quite precise: the steady state is described by an ergodic state; a more precise 
statement is that only gradually does the probability distribution of observed states correspond 
to the eraodic state. 
We &I show that the difference equation for a can give rise to chaotic cycles, in general 
equilibrium versions of the model where the demand for labor affects the wages, and hence 
profits. See Greenwald and Stiglitx (1992). 
i91n this formulation, we assume the ‘price’ of xi is 1, and that the interest rate actually paid 
is random: it is i if the firm does not go bankrupt, and equals whatever the residual value of the 
firm dividend by the sixe of the outstanding debt if it does. i is set so that the expected value of 
r is equal to the safe rate of interest. 
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Fig. 6. Persistence. After a negative shock to net worth (a movement from a* to a,), the 
economy recovers only gradually. 
Under normal assumptions. (decreasing absolute risk aversion) lower wealth 
involves a shift to safer activities:20 a shift out of inventories and into cash, 
and away from ldng run commitments, like investments and new employees. 
The adjustment of some variables themselves are likely to entail more risk 
than others: it may be more difficult to predict the consequences of a change 
“Using our formulation where firms maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth, the first 
order conditions are 
EU’[f’-(l+r))=O, EU’[&-(1 +r))=O, 
or 
E[U’p]/EW’=f’/g’. 
The reduction in a can be viewed as a transformation of the utility function; with lower 4 the 
individual acts in a more risk averse manner, provided only thrit the. utility function is 
characterized by decreaCn g absolute risk aversion [see RothschM and Stiglitz (1970, 1971) or 
Diamond and Stiglitz (1974)], i.e. EU’pjEU’ is smaller (with more weight placed on lower values 
of p), and hence the ratio off’ to g’ is smaller, i.e. for any given value of x2, x1 is larger. 
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in wages and prices than of output. The effect of wage changes depends on 
how workers respond, and how employers at other firms respond. If they 
respond similarly, the adverse effects are likely to be much smaller than if 
they do not. The effect of price decreases depends on how customers 
respond, and how other producers respond. If, for instance, other firms 
respond similarly, the gains from price reductions are likely to be much 
smaller than if they do not. But predicting these responses is indeed difficult. 
On ‘the other hand, the worst that can happen if the firm cuts back its 
production is that its inventories will be slightly depleted, if sales turn out 
higher than expected; and the marginal cost of replenishing them may exceed 
the marginal cost of production today. The uncertainty associated with the 
effect on profits is only associated with the difirence in marginal costs. 
We argue that it is these differences in perceived risks which accounts for 
the relative inertia of wage and price decisions.2’*22 
5.2.5. The interdependence of supply and demand 
Looking at the firms’ decisions from a portfolio perspective has one further 
implication: we observe that investment and employment are, in a way, 
parallel decisions; they are both inputs into the production processes. One is 
an input focused on short-run output, the other affects output both in the 
short and the long run. New hires, requiring training, are even more closely 
analogous to an investment decision. But observing that investment and 
employment are closely related, we then see that, from the perspective of the 
macro-economy, demand and supply decisions are closely related: the 
variables that affect aggregate demand for investment are precisely the same 
variables that affect aggregate supply, the amount that firms are willing to 
%decd, not only may firms not lower their price, there is an argument that when the 
economy goes into a downturn, the firm may actually increase its price, at least relative to its 
marginal cost of production. In a world of imperfect competition, firms need to recruit 
customers. Recruiting customers is an investment (like the hiring decision). One way of affecting 
the rate at which customers are recruited is by lowering the price. Lowering the price loses 
profits today, but gains profits in the future. But as the economy goes into a downturn, the 
implicit cost of the lower price - the lower cash flow, inducing a higher probability of default - 
is increased and the expected gain is reduced (since the firm’s life expectancy is reduced). It pays 
Srms to charge higher mark-ups. 
‘21ndeed, our analysis makes clear the fundamental incoherence of arguments that, in the face 
of certain adjustment costs, the Srm should do nothing. With changing environments, they 
cannot do nothing. The argument of Akerlof and Yellen (1985) that, if tirms have been 
maximizing with respect o wages or prices, the loss in profits from failing to adjust wagts and 
prices is second order does not explain wage and price rigidities: for there is a second order loss 
from the failure to adjust any variable. Our analysis provides a natural definition of what it 
means to do ‘nothing’ - minimixing the risk of the firm. 
The result that failure to adjust any variable, while it has a second order effect on the firm, 
has a first order effect on the economy (on social welfare) is a corollary of the Greenwald- 
Stiglitx theorem (1986), establishing that whenever the economy is not constrained Pareto 
efficient (which it will not be, in the stipulated circumstances) price adjustments (pecuniary 
externalities) can have first order effects. 
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Fig. 7. Aggregate demand and supply. Disturbances to the economy which affect aggregate 
demand are likely, at the same time, to affect aggregate supply. 
produce. The above result concerning the relative magnitude of the vari- 
ability of investment and employment may suggest hat a disturbance to net 
worth may have a larger effect on aggregate demand than on aggregate short 
run supply, but the latter effect is significant, and cannot be ignored (fig. 7). 
5.3. Explaining the basic puzzles 
We have, with this first hypothesis, gone a long way to explaining the five 
anomalies which we set out to explain in the beginning. We have obtained 
large variations in output from relatively small disturbances. Small distur- 
bances in demand can lead to large changes in a, and through that to large 
changes both in the demand for investment and the supply of goods. We 
have also explained the shift in the supply function, as well as the patterns of 
sectoral movements - the volatility of investment and inventories. And we 
have explained the fifth puzzle, the persistence of effects.23 
230~r model can be used to explain other detailed characteristics of cyclical movements. For 
instance, as the economy moves out of a recession, tlrms first put workers on overtime before 
they hire new workers. If we used observed market rates of interest, this practice makes little 
sense, unless firms arc extremely uncertain about whether the recovery is going to stick. Our 
model suggests that they not only need to be convinced about the recovery (so that the risk of 
investment in new workers is reduced), but also that their net worth has to be rephxnished 
(enhancing their capacity or willingness to undertake the risk of the investment). By the same 
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6. The availability of credit 
So far, our analysis has focused on the supply of output and the demand 
for inputs (investment, employment). Associated with this, there is an implied 
demand for credit (the variable B in eq. 8). That analysis assumed an 
unlimited supply of credit at an (expected) return of p. We now need to look 
more closely at the availability of credit. Our theory of credit availability is 
based on combining the principles derived earlier for the theory of risk 
averse firm to banks with the second hypothesis, which stresses the fact that 
credit is not allocated by means of an auction/price process. Our theory of 
credit availability will enable us to explain the one remaining puzzle, the 
money-output nexus. 
6.1. Why price level matters with unindexed debt contracts 
First, focusing for a moment on our hypothesis concerning the importance 
of the difference between debt and equity, we observe that if loan contracts 
are denominated in nominal interest rates, then any policy (including 
monetary policy) which affects the price level in an unexpected way has real 
effects on the economy. It generates real redistributions between debtors and 
creditors, between producers and households; in terms of our model, it leads 
to changes in the real value of a, and we have seen how these changes in the 
average level as well as the distribution of a have real effects.24 To see how 
token, the reduction in wages which workers would have to take, to induce firms to bear the 
risks of investing in hiring them now, relative to what workers expect to obtain if they wait is 
such that workers are not willing to bear these costs. 
Our model can also be. used to explain the absence of profit sharing arrangements (workers 
become, effectively, equity participants, and the asymmetric information arguments for why 
equity markets do not work well also explain why workers may not value highly such equity 
participation.) 
241t is not an adequate attack against the theory to argue that we have not explained why 
loan contracts are not fully indexed. As the familiar joke puts it, the fact that some biologist has 
not explained (and indeed, might not be able to explain) why a giraffe has a long neck does not 
lessen the relevance of his taking into account the consequences of the length of neck. Surely, it is 
wrong to reason that because we cannot explain the length of the neck, or because according to 
some ill-conceived theory, rationally designed necks should be short, we should therefore 
proceed under the assumption that necks are indeed short. We should trust our eyes: giralfe 
necks are indeed long And we should trust the evidence: most loan contracts are indeed not 
indexed. In fact it might be the case that if contracts were indexed some of the macroeconomic 
effects upon which we have focused would disappear. We can only conjecture about what a 
world might be like which is markedly different from the world in which we live. 
It is, of course, a criticism of a theory to say that it is incomplete; and a theory which does 
not explain the lack of indexing is on that account indeed incomplete. Elsewhere, we and others 
have provided several suggestions concerning why contracts might not be indexed. There may be 
multiple equilibria: given that most contracts are not indexed, if a firm indexes one contract, he 
is left bearing more, not less, residual risk. Given asymmetries of information, innovations in 
contract form in bilateral negotiations are frequently looked upon askance [see Stiglitx (199Ob)l: 
one party may be suspicious about the motives of the other for suggesting a reform in the 
standard contracts; with bounded rationality and limited information, the proposer may not be 
able to allay the suspicions that the reform is not meant to be a Pareto improvement, but an 
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changes in the price level may, in particular, affect the supply of credit, we 
need to look more closely at banks. 
6.2. The theory of the risk averse bank 
Banks are a specialized kind of firm, engaged in screening loan applicants, 
certifying creditworthiness and monitoring loans. While fiis borrow money 
from banks, banks borrow money from their depositors. We can think of 
their production activity as making loans. This is a risky activity, and the 
general principles we derived earlier apply here: a reduction in the net worth 
of banks and an increase in the riskiness of their environment will lead them 
to contract their output, i.e. to make fewer loans. 
We have established under a variety of conditions that when banks decide 
to lend less, they may not just put up the lower amount available to auction; 
rather they may ration credit. (For some purposes, the distinction is not that 
important: the consequences of markedly higher credit terms are much like 
those of credit rationing.) 
The reduced availability of credit has multiplier effects throughout the 
economy. It has a direct effect on firms, who may not be able to invest as 
much as they otherwise would. And the reduced investment leaves its usual 
trail of effects. 
But there are a set of indirect effects to which I want to call attention. We 
began this discussion by pointing out the parallel between banks and firms. 
Firms themselves are banks: they provide credit to their customers and 
suppliers. Given the localized nature of information (hypothesis 2), it makes 
sense for firms to ignore Polonius’ injunction to Laertes, by ‘both a borrower 
and a lender’ being. Firms have considerable specialized knowledge about 
those with whom they trade. Lending too is.a risky activity, which, when the 
access to credit of a firm is reduced (or the firm’s net worth is reduced), is 
itself reduced: the firm reduces not only its investment in machines, but also 
in new customers, and in credit to its clients. Thus, the reduction in credit by 
a bank has a ripple effect on credit availability throughout the economy. 
Even the anticipation of credit constraints has these effects: firms know 
that it takes time, and is costly, to adjust their asset positions; a threat of a 
reduction in credit availability in the future will lead them to attempt to 
enhance their cash position, cutting back on inventories and investment. 
Thus, rational expectations concerning future actions of the monetary 
authorities can have anticipatory effects; but unlike some models, where these 
attempt of one party to gain at the expense of the other. The legal system, with its presumption 
that if a non-standard contract is written, the terms of the contract be inteqreted in favor of the 
party not writing the contract,. reinforces the incentives against changes in standard contract 
forms. 
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rational expectations serve to offset the effects, here the anticipations may 
simply serve to increase the speed with which they take effect. 
It should be clear now how, in the absence of the intervention of a 
monetary authority, an economic downturn can be amplified through the 
monetary-credit system. An economic downturn (regardless of its origins) 
results in higher than anticipated defaults, lowering banks’ net worth.25 This, 
combined with the greater uncertainty associated with lending, reduces their 
lending activity, amplifying the economic downturn. Their reduced lending 
activity (possibly anticipated) leads firms to cut back on the credit they make 
available, on the level of investments in which they engage, the number of 
new employees they are willing to hire, and so the downturn gets amplified. 
The deathz6 of a bank or a firm destroys localized knowledge about 
borrowers. It should not be surprising that there are only a limited number 
of firm/banks which have information about any borrower; for information is 
costly; it is a fixed, sunk cost - precisely characteristics which tend to 
preclude competition [see Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990)]. And the fact that 
information is not easily transferable means that the termination or reduc- 
tion in lending activity from one source is not immediately offset by an 
increase in activity from other sources. 
6.3. A simple model of bank behavior 
A simple model captures some of the effects which we have just described. 
Fig. 8 shows a mean-variance curve for a risk averse bank.” The locus R’R’ 
shows the loan portfolio opportunities of the bank, given its net worth and 
deposits (which it is assumed to have no control over, with deposit interest 
rates being fixed). The loan locus is found by the bank maximizing over 
interest rates as well as other characteristics of lending policy. Alternatively, 
*‘This effect is offset, to some extent, in recessionary situations by price declines, which 
increase the real value of payments to the bank. But typically, the increased default rate of the 
recession more than offsets this effect. 
*6There is some ambiguity about what constitutes the ‘death’ of a firm or a bank. A 
reorganization entailing a change in ownership, but not in personnel, obviously does not destroy 
the on-going firm’s information base. Lending activity is adversely affected by the reduction in 
the bank’s net worth and by the reorganization process. 
“The figure assumes there is credit rationing, and that the deposit rate is less than the T-bill 
rate. For other cases, see Greenwald and Stiglitx (1991b). 
The figure is constructed assuming all loan applicants are (in terms of their observable 
charactetistics) identical. Credit rationing exists whenever the aggregate supply of loans (as 
derived in the figure) is less than the aggregate demand for loans. The existence of credit 
rationing does not depend on ‘risk-loving’ behavior of borrowers, induced by limited liability [in 
contrast to the impression sometimes conveyed to casual readers of Stiglitz-Weiss (1981)]. For 
instance, consider the case where a risk averse borrower is indifferent between two projects; the 
ith project yields a return of R’ with probability p’, and a zero return otherwise. Then an 
increase in the interest rate charged decreases expected utility by VCR’-(1 + r)B]p’B, where B is 
the amount borrowed, this is smaller for the project with the high return and low probability of 
suc&Xss. 




Fig. 8. Bank portfolio problem. Banks allocate their funds between T bills and a loan portfolio. 
As the economy goes into a recession, the loan portfolio worsens, inducing less lending activity. 
the bank can invest in T-Bills. The over-all opportunity locus is the line SR*. 
The bank chooses a point, such as E. 
6.3.1. Net worth effects 
A reduction in the bank’s net worth shifts the locus R’R’ and the point S 
in parallel. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, the amount of risk-taking 
- the size of the bank’s loan portfolio - is reduced absolutely. 
6.3.2. Financial fragility 
As the economy goes into a recession, there are further effects: with an 
increased probability of default on the part of borrowers, risk is increased 
and expected return is reduced. The locus R’R’ shifts down and to the right. 
Substitution and wealth effects normally both lead to reduced risk taking; and 
even at the same degree of risk taking (as measured by the portfolio 
variance), there is less lending activity, since there is greater risk associated 
with any single loan. We call this the loan portfolio risk efict. 
The shift in the loan portfolio locus R’R’ may be exacerbated by a 
worsening of the loan applicant pool. Earlier, we noted that with bankruptcy 
costs, firms act in a risk averse manner, provided that they have sufficient 
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capital. It has long been recognized that with limited liability, in the absence 
of bankruptcy costs, firms act as risk lovers.2* For any given bankruptcy 
cost, there is a critical net worth such that, below that net worth, firms act in 
a risk loving manner, above that, in a risk averse manner. Thus, as the 
economy moves into a recession, and firms find their net worth decreased, 
‘good’ (i.e. risk averse) firms reduce their loan applications, ‘bad’ (i.e. risk 
loving) firms may increase their loan applications, and there is an increasing 
proportion of bad (i.e. low net worth) applicants. The lower net worth 
induces these firms to undertake even greater risks. 
There are further reasons that the loan opportunity locus worsens. At all 
times, there is a turnover in a bank’s customer portfolio, as some old 
customers go into bankruptcy, and new firms are created. In a recession, 
lending opportunities are shrinking, as regular customers go bankrupt, or 
move into the ‘near-bankruptcy’ category. A recession, with reduced bank net 
worth, is hardly the time to invest in new customer relations. There may be a 
presumption that a firm is seeking a new bank relationship has had its credit 
cut off by its existing bank (except in the case where its regular bank has 
gone into bankruptcy) - and the new bank knows that banks will be cutting 
off their worst prospects first. Firms are not in the process of borrowing to 
expand, but rather to survive. 
We have thus identified seoeral reasons that banks are likely to reduce 
lending activity as the economy goes into a recession: 
(a) Reduced net worth leads to reduced risk taking, i.e. reduced lending. 
(b) Worsening lending opportunities lead to reduced lending activity, as a 
result of wealth, substitution, and loan portfolio risk effects. 
(c) The effect of bankruptcies of some banks is not offset by expansion of 
others. 
And there are four reasons that lending opportunities appear to worsen as 
the economy goes into a recession: 
(a) An increased probability of default by each loan applicant (the ‘direct’ 
increased risk effect); 
(b) a decrease in the number of regular bank customers about whom the 
bank is informed (the decreased information effect); 
(c) an increase in the proportion of risk loving applicants (an adverse 
selection effect); 
(d) among this increasing proportion of risk loving applicants, an adverse 
“‘Firm’s pay-offs are then max {a,O}, a convex function. 
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incentive effect, offset, to some extent, by a positive incentive effect among 
the shrinking proportion of risk averse applicants. 
These effects may be so strong as to lead to a situation where the bank 
makes no loans at all: the credit market collapses, because the expected 
return to loans is actually lower than on T-bills.” Since what is relevant for 
the curve R’R’ is lenders’ perceptions of the riskiness of borrowers and their 
ability (based on their net worth) to bear risks, both of which can change 
quickly, it is evident that credit markets can exhibit considerable ‘fragility’. 
4.4. Monetary policy 
How might monetary policy offset these effects? Can it? More generally, 
how does monetary policy work? In brief, monetary policy can affect the 
ability and willingness of banks to lend. Changing the reserve requirements 
obviously a&&s bank’s ability to lend. In effect, in the United States, where 
reserves do not bear interest, increased reserve requirements move the 
opportunity locus SR* inward, in a parallel fashion: the wealth effect leads to 
less lending. 
6.4.1. Open market operations 
More subtle are the consequences of open market operations. These affect 
the supply of reserves, on the one hand, and the supply of T-bills being 
publicly traded on the other. We can cut into any general equilibrium system 
by looking at one market or another, and, in a complete description, it 
should make no difference. Here, we focus on the market for T-bills. 
A reduction in supply of publicly available T-bills increases the price, and 
lowers interest rates. Depositor rates adjust slowly, more slowly than T-bill 
rates. Accordingly, changes in T-bill rates affect the ‘seignorage’ of banks. 
There is a wealth effect, which leads to less lending activity; but offsetting 
this is a substitution effect: low interest rates make T-bills less attractive 
investments for banks, relative to loans, and this by itself should encourage 
banks to lend more. (In terms of our diagram, fig. 9, an open market 
operation moves the point S down relative to the curve RR.) When the bank 
is flush with capital, the threat of bankruptcy is low, wealth effects may be 
negligible, and the substitution effects may dominate: there is a strong 
29Even when the expected return on loans exceeds that on T-bills, the bank may wish to 
make no loans. Our diagrams so far have assumed that there is no risk associated with T-bills. 
In fact, so long as T-bills are (imlnzfectly) indexed, there is real risk, and so long as there is real 
risk, the slope of the indifference curve at the point S is strictly positive, and hence conceivably 
greater than the slope of the opportunity locus to the right of S. The opportunity locus will now 
not be a straight line; but the bank’s decision, choosing a mix of an optimally chosen loan 
portfolio, and T-bills, is essentially the same [see the Cass-Stiglitz (1970) two-mutual fimd 
theorem]. 
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Fig. 9. A reduction in the interest rate on T bills has a wealth e5ect and a substitution effect; 
former leads to less loans, the latter to more. 
the 
positive effect on loan supply. 3o On the other hand, in bad times, when the 
bank is already worrying about bankruptcy, the wealth effect becomes 
stronger. In fig. 9, there is only a slight shift in the equilibrium to E,. 
Figs. 8-9 assumed that all loan projects (which passed the bank’s screening 
process) were identical. But some projects may be better than others, and fig. 
10 shows the consequence, for an extreme case where there are only two 
types of projects. The opportunity locus then has a kink. The change in the 
T-bill rate shifts the opportunity locus, but the bank still chooses to operate 
at the kink. There are no additional loans made. 
The moral of the story is simple: you can lead a horse to water but you 
can’t make it drink. In extreme recessions, it may be extremely difftcult to 
induce banks to lend more. 
Of course, the actual history of the economy is not traced out by the shifts 
in figs. g-10. Rather, as we have noted, what is happening is that as the 
“‘There is also the possibility - made all too familiar by the S & L debacle in the U.S. - that if 
net worth becomes too low, the bank becomes a risk lover, and loan supply may actually 
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Fig. 10. Insensitivity of lending activity to monetary policy. With two types of borrowers (good 
and bad) monetary policy may again have no effect on lending activity. 
economy goes into a downturn, banks view their loan opportunity locus as 
shifting downward. In the absence of monetary authority intervention, loans 
would rapidly decrease. The monetary authorities can be viewed as leaning 
against a stream of water rushing the other way. They may be able to slow 
down the stream, but they have little chance of reversing its direction. 
This does not fully answer the question, is there some rate of monetary 
expansion (some level of intervention by the monetary authorities) where 
credit would expand sufficiently to sustain the economy? Or more accurately, 
we should ask, is there some rate where the economy would ignite before 
inflation would ignite? To answer this, we need to return to the theme of 
monetary neutrality. 
6.5. The classical dichotomy once again3’ 
Is it possible that no matter what the monetary authorities do, only the 
“It should perhaps be emphasized that while the classical dichotomy is usually presented in 
the context of the standard neoclassical (Walrasian) model, it is more general: even with 
monopolic market structures, changes in the money supply should make no difference. 
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price level would change, and nothing real would happen? As an aside, it 
should be noted that changes in the price level themselves (in an imperfectly 
indexed world) have real effects, as we have seen. The inflationary effects of 
monetary expansion would themselves represent positive redistributions 
towards firms, and thus serve to stimulate the economy.32 
But the theory we have presented earlier provides the basis of a theory of 
nominal price rigidities33 as well: for so long as it is not common knowledge 
that money is neutral (and with imperfect indexing, the real redistributions 
associated with monetary expansions have real consequences), it would be 
risky for firms to act as if money was neutral. They surely will be uncertain 
whether increases in money have proportionate effects on the price level (for 
there is no empirical evidence supporting that belief); and given that 
uncertainty, they will not set their prices proportionate to changes in the 
money supply, at least in the short run. Non-neutrality is self-conlirming 
(just as neutrality might be - and in most reasonable models, would be - 
self-confirming if all contracts were fully indexed and it were common 
knowledge that that was the case).34 
Money, and more particularly, the banking institutions through which 
money is created in modern economies, are a central part of the capital 
market. It is, accordingly, not surprising that we should need to turn to a 
theory of the capital markets in general, and banks in particular, for an 
understanding of the role of money and credit, and the non-neutrality of 
money. But prices, in modem economies, are set by firms, not by mythical 
Walrasian auctioneers, who might indeed have been instructed to respond 
neutrally to changes in the money supply. Thus, we need simultaneously to 
construct a theory of bank behavior and firm pricing behavior: a task which 
we have now done. 
7. Rationality and Keynesian economics 
On the other side of the Atlantic, for a while, to invoke the name of 
Keynes was to associate oneself with the intellectual dinosaurs, or (to 
continue the metaphor) at least with a species (or at least a specious school) 
which, if not yet extinct, would surely soon be, and deservedly so. The ad 
“There are other reasons that monetary policies, different rules concerning the rate of change 
of the money supply, would have real effects, even when the average rate of monetary expansion 
is fixed, for the pattern of returns to holding dollar denominated assets would change, and this 
would affect he demand for such assets relative to real assets. 
Though this effect is probably not as important as the other effects which I emphasize in this 
paper, it surely is at least as important as the real balance effects which have played such a 
central role in macro economic theory since Keynes. 
“It is worth noting that several-of the rekntly developed theories involving ‘convention 
equilibrium’ can also give rise to nominal rigidities; see, e.g. Stiglitz (1985, 1987b). 
?See Greenwald, Clay, and Stiglitz (1990). 
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hoc nature of the assumptions - their lack of basis in principles of 
maximization and rational behavior - condemned this line of thought to a 
perhaps not untimely death. 
Today, most of us, -1 hope, recognize that the so-called ‘rational’ models 
were, in their own way, as ad hoc - and perhaps less realistic - than the 
Keynesian models: they were based on models of representative (identical) 
agents. Not only was that asssumption unrealistic, results of Mantel, Debreu, 
and others had already shown that virtually any set of aggregate functions 
satisfying Walras’ Law could have been derived from some set of rational 
agents: once diversity was taken into account, the seemingly ad hoc 
assumptions most macro-economists had long employed could indeed be 
reconciled with maximizing behavior after all (and they were far more 
realistic than the particular parameterizations employed by many of those 
using the so-called rational approach, which employed utility functions, such 
as exponential or constant elasticity, the empirical implications of which were 
not only stringent, but clearly inconsistent with observed facts.)j’ 
There are other no less important elements of ad hocery that are frequently 
included in the so-called ‘rational’ models: monetary policies requiring cash 
in advance leave unexplained why credit cannot be used for facilitating 
transactions rather than cash. Indeed, this is an ad hocery for which no 
adequate explanation will ever be found - because it is in fact counterfactual, 
with most transactions being facilitated by credit, not cash. (It is not an 
explanation to construct a model in which individuals meet only once, so 
credit is not feasible: for that is no more true to life than the assumption that 
cash is required for all transactions. While it may be true that ad hocery, like 
beauty, may be in the eyes of the beholder, ad hocery is not the only vice 
from which a model may suffer: assumptions and conclusions which are 
counterfactual represent far worse sins.) 
Our model invokes ‘rationality’ - indeed, more rationality than I believe is 
realistic. It differs from the neoclassical models not so much in that 
hypothesis as in the assumptions concerning information,36 and the related 
analysis of how markets and other economic institutions function with 
imperfect information. Consider, for instance, the standard criticism of 
Keynesian models, that they leave unexploited arbitrage opportunities: if, for 
instance, firms are off their supply curve, they could simply lower their prices. 
The imperfect information models upon which the analysis of this paper is 
based argue that there are no costless arbitrages: everyone is in fact 
‘$For instance, the exponential utility function, as convenient as it is for calculations, implies 
a zero wealth elasticity for risky assets. 
36While some new classical rational expectations models focus on consequences of infor- 
mation imperfections, they explore only a limited set of informational problems (e.g. amoming 
the money supply) - probably not even the central ones - and do not consider the possible 
consequences for how markets function. 
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8. New and old Keynesian theories 
Our model, while it bears a close resemblance to traditional Keynesian 
models, differs from it in several important respects, to which I should briefly 
call attention. [The differences are differences which I think Keynes would 
have liked. Hicks, who is to blame for many of the popular interpretations of 
Keynes, arrived at very similar views to those presented here in the years 
shortly before he died. See Hicks (1988).] 
The first important difference was that Keynes failed to distinguish 
between the sources of finance, between debt and equity. This distinction 
plays an important role in our interpretation. 
Secondly, and relatedly, Keynes -had a very neoclassical theory of invest- 
ment, with firms investing up to the point where the expected marginal 
return equalled the real interest rate. In this part of his analysis, he seemed 
to (uncharacteristically) ignore risk and credit market ‘imperfections’. We 
have stressed both, explaining why risk cannot be divested, and why credit 
rationing may be prevalent. (The unimportance of the interest rate was one 
of the bases for Andrews’ early criticism of Keynes.) 
Having made these two ‘errors’, he was naturally led to the third: he 
focused on the interest rate as the mechanism by which monetary policy 
affected the economy. He focused on the ‘money’ side of banks’ balance 
sheets, and how households’ demand for money becomes extremely elastic in 
deep recessions. We have focused on the ‘credit’ side of banks’ balance sheet. 
Money and credit are, of course, closely linked, but our analysis shifts the 
focus away from households’ demand for money towards banks’ supply of 
credit. In deep recessions, it is the unwillingness (and inability) of banks to 
make loans which obviates the effect of monetary policy, not the high 
elasticity of households’ demand for money. 
9. Policy prescriptions 
Though there are these important distinctions between our theory and 
traditional Keynesian theory, there are also many similarities. 
9.1. Channels of monetary policy 
Elsewhere, we have shown how one can resurrect a modified ISLM 
framework on more sound principles than those of Hicks: there is one 
important modification, which has some policy importance - there are some 
changes in monetary policy, like changes in reserve requirements, which 
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affect at any level of national income and any set of real and nominal interest 
rates, the availability of credit; and through this means, shifts in monetary 
policy may have a direct effect on the IS (the goods market equilibrium) 
curve, not mediated through changes in interest rates. 
9.2. Wage and price flexibility 
Keynes argued that wage-price flexibility would not restore the economy 
to full employment, because of adverse effects of wage decreases on aggregate 
demand. Wages and prices fell dramatically between 1929 and 1933, and this 
wage and price flexibility did not work: Keynes was right. One might argue 
that with suficient wage and price flexibility the Walrasian equilibrium must 
necessarily be restored. (The real balance effect would eventually revive 
aggregate demand.) ” The Walrasian model, with its perfect information, 
perfect market assumptions is sufficiently flawed as to raise doubt about that 
conclusion: but what is clear is that estimated wealth elasticities of consump- 
tion, investment interest elasticities, etc. are such as to suggest hat it might 
take an enormous fall in wages and prices to restore full employment. And 
our analysis suggests that so long as there are nominal credit contracts in 
place, the redistributions, the bankruptcies, and the resulting economic 
disruptions which would result would, at least in the short run, worsen 
matters, not make them better. It is not just the effect of real wage changes 
on the demand for consumer goods by credit-constrained households, but the 
effects on firms’ real cash flows and balance sheets which are of crucial 
importance. 
9.3. Ineffectiveness of monetary policy 
The recent episode of monetary ineffectiveness in the United States - an 
ineffectiveness which we had predicted - provides further evidence in support 
of our theory. The Fed succeeded in substantially lowering interest rates on 
Treasury bills, but lending rates failed to fall commensurately, and lending 
activity failed to increase. Banks invoked both the arguments put forward in 
this paper as an explanation of their behavior: their net worth had been 
greatly reduced as a result of a series of ‘misfortunes’ - bad real estate loans, 
bad oil and gas loans, and bad Third World debt; and the high bankruptcy 
rate increased the perceived risk of lending, a risk which could only partially 
be mitigated through increased collateral requirements (which, by themselves, 
would have reduced the supply of qualifying borrowers). 
.While our theory thus conforms well with the policy perspectives of 
“Neary and Stiglitz (1990) and Grandmont (1983) show that there may be adverse short run 
effects of price declines. 
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traditional Keynesian analysis - though the arguments underlying those 
conclusions are somewhat different - there are several respects in which our 
theory has policy predictions which differ from, or go beyond those of, 
traditional Keynesian theory. We briefly call attention to five. 
9.4. Do government policies succeed in stabilizing the economy? 
First, there has been concern that in the post-Keynsian era, volatility has 
remained high, perhaps as high as in the pre-Keynes era (though the latter 
contention has been hotly contested). 38 Our analysis provides a partial 
explanation of this: assume the government succeeded in substantially 
reducing volatility. Then firms would undertake greater risk, e.g. by increas- 
ing their debt-equity ratio (viz. the markedly increased debt-equity ratios 
over the past decade). But then a variety of shocks would have an even 
greater impact on the economy. Thus, the net reduction in volatility may be 
much smaller: yet there may be substantial gains in economic eficiency, in 
allowing firms to undertake riskier (presumably higher return) activities than 
they otherwise would have. 
9.5. Tax policy, risk sharing, and economic stability 
Secondly, tax policies affect the efficiency of the economy’s ability to bear 
risk. Domar and Musgrave long ago recognized that the government was 
like a silent partner. But the government is not like any partner that one 
would like to take on voluntarily: for while he shares profits, he does not 
fully share losses, and this lack of risk sharing may indeed exacerbate the 
consequences of limitations on the markets’ ability to share risk, upon which 
we have already focused. The limitations on loss offsets are there for a good 
reason: to prevent tax abuses. The question is, are there ways in which the 
government can more effectively share risk, without at the same time opening 
the door to such abuses. I believe there are, but a fuller exploration of these 
must await another occasion. 
9.6. Corporate taxation: average vs. marginal rates 
Thirdly, many tax policies represent shifts in the tax burden, particularly in 
the current ‘tight’ fiscal climate of the United States and other countries. An 
attempt to stimulate consumption through individual tax reduction might be 
matched by an increase in corporate auerage tax rates. Believers in the 
standard Keynesian model might believe that such a shift would stimulate 
38See e.g. Romer (1987). 
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the economy. Consumers will spend more, and so long as firms’ marginal 
cost of capital or marginal returns are not affected, then investment will not 
be adversely affected. Indeed, it is possible to increase average tax rates on 
corporations and lower their marginal tax rates, and such a shift would 
actually stimulate investment. Our analysis argues for the importance of 
average corporate tax rates, for it ,is these which affect the firms’ net worth, 
and its ability and willingness to bear risks. And investment responses to 
changes in net worth may indeed be quite large. Thus, the loss in aggregate 
demand from the increase in the average corporate tax rate ,may more than 
offset the gain in aggregate demand by consumers. 
9.7. The importance of supply side responses 
Fourthly, in many Eastern European countries, concern about inflation 
has led to marked contractions in the availability of credit. Several commen- 
tators [see, e.g. Calvo and Frankel (1991)] have noted that the resulting 
economic contraction is dominated not so much by a reduction in demand 
as by a contraction in supply, as firms without working capital have had to 
cut back on their level of production. Old fashioned Keynesian models, with 
their exclusive attention to aggregate demand, missed this potentially import- 
ant aspect of the economy’s response, an aspect which our analysis has 
explicitly focused upon. 
9.8. Small open economies 
Fifthly, Keynesian analysis has always had a problem in small open 
economies. On the one hand, in competitive versions, the country faces a 
perfectly elastic demand for its products at the appropriate exchange rate: if 
the country can sell anything, it can sell as much as it wants; there is no 
problem of insutIicient aggregate demand. On the other hand, with perfect 
capital markets, real interest rates are determined internationally, so that 
monetary authorities at most can affect the exchange rate. If investment is 
affected, it cannot be because of effects on real interest rates, but only 
because of effects on exchange rates. 
Yet small open economies - including those exporting in competitive 
markets - do experience economic fluctuations, and monetary policy often 
seems effective and not just because of changes in exchange rates. Our theory 
provides an explanation. The fluctuations in output are supply, not demand 
driven. And our theory emphasizes that while markets for government T-bills 
may work quite well, capital for loan purposes does not flow so freely. 
Monetary policy can affect the credit institutions within a country, and by 
that means, have a real effect on the economy. (Of course, even that effect 
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may get weakened, as multinational firms switch their borrowing from banks 
in one country to another.) Local banks, with localized knowledge, remain 
at&ted, and thus their lending activities, and the level of aggregate conomic 
activity.3g 
Concluding remarks 
The last fifteen years have seen a revolution in our thinking about 
micro-economics, about how markets function. Principal-agent problems, 
incentive-compatibility constraints, moral hazard problems, selection 
problems, imperfect competition have become, if not household words, words 
familiar to all graduate students in economics. Even policy discussions are 
increasingly carried out using such terms - most notably, in the debates 
concerning the S & L and banking crisis in the United States. 
Only gradually have we recognised that this change in our micro- 
economics necessitates a corresponding change in our macro-economic 
theories. In this paper, I have attempted to describe one part of that research 
program - that focusing on capital markets. It is an exciting research 
program - as many questions have been raised as have been answered. The 
theory is far from complete - though it is far more complete than it was but 
a few years ago. Other parts of the research’ program have involved the 
analysis of labor markets and the construction of simple, general equilibrium 
models [see, e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988c, 1990)] bringing together 
capital, labor, and product markets. High on the agenda for future research 
is further empirical verification of the theory - though, from our perspective, 
the fact that the theory is able to explain so many phenomena which, under 
the standard theory, seem so anomalous provides strong empirical support to 
the theory. At the same time, it is worth noting that many of the micro- 
economic aspects of, the theory - the relative unimportance of equity, the 
adverse effect of equity issues on share prices, the dependence of investment 
on cash flow and firm balance sheet variables - have received increasing 
empirical support.40 
While, to be sure, the theory is far from complete, the results, both 
theoretical and empirical, obtained so far suggest that it holds out the 
promise not only of resolving some long standing macro-economic puzzles, 
but also of allowing us to design macro-economic policies which more 
effectively stabilize the economy. 
39A similar analysis suggests that banking regulations which affect the flow of funds within a 
country (such as laws restricting interstate banking) can have real effects; and reducing these 
barriers need not be welfare improving. 
*O.&e, e.g. Hubbard (1990). 
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